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AGO, D/A ltr, 11 Jun 1980


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
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REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF:

DAAG-PAP-A (M) (23 Apr 73) DAMO-ODU

AD 922369

SUBJECT: Senior Officer Debriefing Report: Senior Advisors, Bac Lieu, Kien Giang, Phong Dinh, and Ba Xuyen Provinces, MR 4, Period Ending February 1973

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Frederick R. Daly

1. Reference: AR 525-14, Senior Officer Debriefing Report (U), 4 July 1971.
2. Transmitted herewith are reports of Senior Advisors of the MR 4 Provinces, for the period ending February 1973.
  - a. LTC K. Kobata, SA, Bac Lieu Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B007, Inclosure 1
  - b. LTC Edward P. Metzner, SA, Kien Giang Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B018, Inclosure 2.
  - c. LTC William F. Fitzpatrick, Phong Dinh Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B023, Inclosure 3.
  - d. LTC Frederick R. Daly, SA, Ba Xuyen Province, DAMO-ODU, 73B030, Inclosure 4
3. These reports are provided to insure appropriate benefits are realized from the experiences of the authors. These reports should not be interpreted as the official view of the Department of the Army, or of any agency of the Department of the Army.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

*Verne L. Bowers*  
VERNE L. BOWERS  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

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HEADQUARTERS  
ADVISORY TEAM 71 (BA XUYEN PROVINCE)  
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
APO 96215

MACDR-71

15 February 1973


SUBJECT: APRIS Province Senior Advisor Completion of Tour Report  
(RCS: MACCORDS 174.03) LTC Frederick R. Daly, [REDACTED]

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THRU: DEPCORDS  
Delta Regional Assistance Command  
APO 96215

TO: HQ, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
ATTN: MACCORDS (ACoFS, CORDS)  
APO 96222

Attached is my completion of tour report for the period 17 June 1972 to 15 February 1973.

  
FREDERICK R. DALY  
LTC, FA  
Deputy Province Senior Advisor

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DAM-ODU  
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Inclosure 4

SECTION I

NAME: Frederick Robert Daly

GRADE: Lt. Col.

PII Redacted

SSAN: [REDACTED]

BRANCH OF SERVICE: Field Artillery

PROVINCE: Ba Kuyen, MR 4

INCLUSIVE DATES OF TOUR: 17 June 1972 to 15 February 1973

EXPECTED REASSIGNMENT DATE: 15 February 1973

PREVIOUS TOUR IN VIETNAM: September 1963 to September 1964

ASSIGNMENT ON PREVIOUS VIETNAM TOUR:

- A. Order of Battle Advisor JCS, Saigon, September 1963 - November 1963
- B. Intelligence Advisor, 9th VN Infantry Division, November 1963 -  
September 1964

## SECTION II

1. What background did you have for your position?

I have had command at battery level and staff experience at Battalion, Division, Corps, and Dep of the Army level. My civilian educational background in behavioral sciences, BA (Psychology), MA (Sociology), applied PD candidate in sociology, also assisted me greatly in this position. The above experience is in addition to that indicated in Section I.

2. What training did you have for this position?

I attended the Vietnam Training Center (VTC) Foreign Service Institute, Washington, D.C. from August 1971 to March 1972. Total instruction was 33 weeks including about 28 weeks in Vietnamese language training.

3. What additional training would you have suggested for your position?

I would recommend a more intensive language course and reduce the scope of the District and Provincial portions of the program.

4. What should be the length of tour for your position?

I believe that 18 months should be the optimum tour. Because of the demands placed on PSAs and DPSAs, they can be most effective during a tour of this length. A one-year tour would not make maximum use of their training and experience.

5. Was support from Region and/or Saigon Headquarters satisfactory? If not, specify deficiencies.

a. One of the two major problem areas that plagued this team was the lack of support for sector logistical areas. This support was received from two areas, the Vietnamese SLSC facility, and US logistical support at IV Corps. This team was constantly faced with logistical problem areas such as nonavailability of tires for jeeps, lack of points and spare plugs for generators, inoperative butane refrigerators, movie projectors, and radios. In essence, if it required anything greater than first echelon maintenance, then it became a problem. Some of the reasons this occurred was extreme usage of these items in remote areas and the effect of climate on relatively old items of equipment. This one factor probably detracted from the district teams' missions of pacification and development more than any other event. In any future operation of this magnitude, remote teams should be mobile and not semi-fixed. By being based at Province, they would be able to devote all their time to mission requirements.

b. Administrative support continues to be the second major problem area. The organizational hierarchy is adequate for command and control but the distribution system is less than adequate.



Numerous critical items of correspondence are either lost or mis-routed. Sixty to seventy percent of the mail this team receives is for individuals or organizations that have departed this area at least a year ago. The only bright light in this "paper" war has been the radical improvement of the handling of awards. SFC Burgin at DRAC has performed the impossible in straightening out one of our biggest headaches and morale problems. Advisors usually have to travel to Saigon to alleviate finance difficulties, necessitating three days away from their primary duties. Generally, a portion of these problems are attributed to the dual channel of requirements and distribution of DRAC and CORDS. Future planning of similar situations should alleviate this obvious deficiency.

6. Were there any programs delayed because support was not forthcoming? Were there any programs that were especially successful because support was readily available? Which ones?

Traditionally, those programs that have command emphasis and interest are those that become successful. When the Province Chief insisted on results in the Land-to-the-Tiller program, an immediate improvement was noted. This team receives numerous directives and suggestion for program emphasis from higher headquarters with requests to push these programs at our level. It has been noted that when these requests are coordinated at higher headquarters with VN counterparts and the VN also receive directives to implement the same programs, then an immediate response occurs.

7. Do the reporting requirements as set forth in Joint Directive A-70 provide means for reporting all information of present and future value? If not, what changes would you recommend?

The present reporting system is adequate, and the format as delineated in the Province Report is considered excellent.

8. Do MACCORDS Management Information System Field Reporting requirements set forth in Joint Directive A-70 adequately measure programs in pacification programs?

The existing reporting requirements are considered adequate to measure those programs we are interested in. The indices developed in the HES reporting systems if properly utilized are also considered an excellent management tool for middle level managers.

9. Where instructions from higher headquarters clear with no conflicting requirements? If not, what specific instances occurred where conflicting instructions were received?

Yes, instructions were clear from higher headquarters, The only conflict this headquarters continually observed was the inordinate amount of visitors, both announced and unannounced, for whom we were required to provide some type of assistance. These visitors, both VN and US, were

interested in the Province Development Office, and as that office was reduced in strength and capabilities, there seemed to be a geometric increase in the number of visitors. These conflicts eventually will mean that the US side of the development program personnel will become reporters and for all practical purposes will cease to be advisors, with resultant decrease in influence in provincial developmental programs.

10. The most clearly defined and directed programs are:

- a. Territorial Security
- b. Local Administration
- c. Land-to-the-Tiller

11. The most effective para-military forces are:

- a. NPFB
- b. ADP
- c. RF

12. The most successful pacification programs are:

- a. Territorial Security
- b. Land-to-The-Tiller
- c. Local Administration

13. The programs that have the greatest effect on pacification are:

- a. Territorial Security
- b. Land-to-the-Tiller
- c. Public Works.

14. The least successful pacification programs are:

- a. People's Information
- b. Labor
- c. Youth Affairs.

15. The programs that have the least impact on pacification are:

- a. Youth Affairs
- b. People's Information
- c. Labor

16. The rural people (are)(are not) aware of the pacification effort the GVN and US are making. If not, how can they be informed. (They are).

If one believes the pacification analysis studies methodology is a valid research design, then to a limited degree, the rural people are informed about the various pacification programs. However, more pragmatically, if the program has monetary incentives to the rural people, they are generally aware of it and will aggressively request its implementation.

17. The people, as you know them, are (more)(less) committed to the GVN when you assumed your job, why? (more committed).

When they are given security, they are committed to the GVN. When I assumed my present position, security was not good because of the spring 1972 offensive. Present attitudes as determined by the US advisory staff, reflect a more position attitude toward the GVN. Another recent development, that of assigning cadets in each village to explain the GVN's present policies, has considerably enhanced the GVN's position vis-a-vis a year ago.

18. Do you feel that the pacification plan is sufficiently detailed to provide guidance and set goals that will result in security and growth of Vietnam (Yes)(NO). If no what change in the plan should be made. (yes)

The 1972-1975 CD&LD Plan is excellent and represents a considerable improvement over past plans. The guidance and goals seem to be realistic, but like all plans, it is dependent upon its implementation. Future emphasis from higher headquarters will determine greatly its future effectiveness.

RD Cadre: The RD Cadre continues to be the backbone of the village structure. They provide a variety of governmental services ranging from teaching in remote areas to delivering mail. Their accessibility to the rural population provides them a unique position of understanding villages' needs and aspirations. Pacification research teams should give special emphasis to what the RD Cadre report. There seems to be a tendency to give additional requirements to the RD Cadre because of their educational background and excellent training. This trend could lead to a diminution of the quality of work now produced by the RD Cadre. There is a total of 53 RDC control groups, in Ba Xuyen consisting of a maximum of 8 persons per group. Additionally, a total of eight RDC District Control Groups, consisting of a maximum of five cadre each, are located in each district headquarters.

Ethnic Minorities: The Cambodian communities continue to use the pagodas as the local points for secular as well as religious affairs. The province hierarchy maintains a polite relationship with their leaders and goes to great lengths to avoid confrontations. Thach Piech remains the head of the Cambodian people and still wields considerable control of the Cambodian community. The ethnic Chinese exert a significant economic influence in the province. Both groups seem to support the government and are attempting to improve the life styles of their constituencies.

Local Government: This province continues to staff 98% of the village-level positions and 94% of the hamlet-level positions. The vacancies result from normal personnel turnover and are not expected to have a detrimental effect on village/hamlet operations. The projected province budget for 1973 is 157 million \$VN, and the total Village Budget projection is 407 million \$VN. In addition, the Finance Service has sent its Local Revenue Cadre to make a census of Khanh Hung Village residential and business land tax rolls to the Finance Service and two villages, Thanh Tri and An Ninh, collected 7 million \$VN in land tax during the first thirty days of January 1973. This performance is a good indicator that all villages in Ba Xuyen will reach 100% Administrative Self-Sufficiency in 1973. Local Government continues to improve because of reorganization under Decree 120 and training of local officials at various sites. The effect of PMAT cannot be over-emphasized as a most necessary management tool in checking progress or regress of various governmental officials.

Aid in Kind: Several hundred thousand piasters were provided to purchase materials for various provincial projects. AIK continues to be as means of subverting normal budgetary channels and protects for those who, inefficiently, do not provide for proper planning sequencing when determining future logistical requirements.

#### REFUGEE DIRECTORATE

Refugee: Ba Xuyen refugees are not in camps. They move from VC or contested areas and resettle where land is available. Only after they have been established in secure areas and resettled with their families are they listed on

the village and hamlet census. Payments during 1972 totalled 1,724.230\$VN to 2,725 displaced war victims and 2,344,100\$VN to 642 in-place war victims. This increase occurred as a result of the spring enemy offensive. The refugee system seems to be too little, too late. The needy have to wait for the bureaucratic wheels to turn, so that any immediate psychological effect is lost by delay.

Social Welfare: RTV: In order to implement effectively the Return to the Village (RTV) program, a better system of surveying applicants to determine eligibility should be devised. Probably this will require command emphasis similar to that applied to the LTTT; namely district chiefs and village chiefs will be made responsible for insuring that the program benefits the largest possible number of individuals. District and village officials would be tasked with preparing the survey list, attesting to its accuracy and allocating benefits to eligible participants.

Development Projects for RTV Hamlets: This program should be combined with the existing VSD program. During 1972, funding problems at the Central Government level delayed the selection of projects; as a consequence, many of the projects originally scheduled under this program were shifted into the VSD program. Since both programs are very similar at the implementation levels, it would be more efficient to manage the resources under one, not two, programs.

Food for Peace: In terms of implementing the pacification program, the Food for Peace School Lunch Program has the greatest potential for success in the post cease-fire period. It directly benefits school children and can be used as the basis for several other programs; e.g., nutrition, health care, mothers' clubs, etc. This program affords the distributing agency with the opportunity to present a message. Most parents are interested in their children and their children's future; consequently will tend to respect and cooperate with those organizations that have programs oriented toward children.

#### CHIEU HOI DIRECTORATE

Chieu Hoi: Throughout the Delta, few Hoi Chanhs are now turning themselves in. It is recommended that these provincial facilities be closed and all Hoi Chanh be sent to Can Tho as a regional organizational facility.

#### REPORTS AND ANALYSIS DIRECTORATE

Report Requirements: The report requirements were not unrealistic considering the propensity of Americans for large amounts of data and charts. This event became critical in the Province Development Office where reduction in personnel coincided with increased reporting requirements. The question then becomes, does our mission here require us to be primarily advisors or reporters? In the PDO office, we are becoming reporters.

Report Feedback: Information was adequate but usually late to be used effectively.

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PHUNG HOANG DIRECTORATE

Phung Hoang: The Phung Hoang Program since coming under the direct control of the NP has lost a little of its effectiveness because of the lack of understanding on the part of many District and Village Police Chiefs on how to properly implement the program. Phung Hoang personnel have not received the proper logistical support because National Police Command at the Saigon level has not increased the budget to cover them. Many of the VC/VCI apprehended through Phung Hoang efforts are subsequently released by the Province Security Committee, thus further frustrating Phung Hoang efforts.

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Public Health: The Public Health program continues to be viable: Health for Study and the Sanitary Hamlet program continue to have priority emphasis. In addition, Public Health is organizing special PH/POLWAR "Welcome" campaigns for remote areas to provide special health examinations and services for people in insecure areas.

Education: If the cease-fire continues to be successful, the Education Service will be in an excellent position to insure that an adequate education system exists at the hamlet level. At present, remote areas offer little except a school with four walls. Teachers assigned to these areas usually last about one month; then they leave. This trend occurs for many reasons: poor security, poor facilities and boredom are perhaps the most common. Efforts to promote education in the hamlet should meet these problems head-on. Monetary incentives should be offered, and better living facilities should be built. The responsibility for all aspects of local education, except teacher certification, should rest with the Village Council and be financed through the Village Budget.

Present MOI funding procedures are painfully inadequate and slow. Shifting this responsibility follows the general objectives of making the village self-sufficient.

Public Works: The Public Works program continues to progress smoothly. Post-cessate-fire activity will undoubtedly lead to the repair of those roads which have been damaged since 1945, such as TH-42, HL-10, HL-2, HL-1, and XL-1 plus destroyed bridges. This will, in fact, open up several remote and isolated areas.

Economic Development & Domestic Production: In order for the pacification effort to succeed, immediate steps should be taken to reverse the acute shortage of credit and investment funds at the village and hamlet level. The Vietnamese farmer is potentially better off today than he has ever been. He has three hectares of land and high productivity because of IR rice. Paddy-selling rice prices are high; fertilizer is available; a system of rural technology is beginning to appear.

This program continues to be the strongest development program in Ba Xuyen. The Agriculture Development Fee served as the necessary catalyst and has led to the creation of village and hamlet level tax-collection teams.

Current estimates are that the 1973 Revenue Collection goals will be met. Two districts, Long Phu and Thanh Tri, have collected 19,684,742VN and 18,432,146VN, respectively during January. Cease-fire activities have created bottlenecks. Village and hamlet officials are working day and night to provide proper protection and prevent VC infiltration.

The province administration recognized this problem prior to the cease-fire. At a province-wide meeting of village chiefs held in mid-January, each village chief was requested to indicate how much money would be collected in his village by mid-March. The Deputy District Chief and two Village Chiefs who register top results will be rewarded. The Advisory Team is trying to arrange for the top performers to attend the AID Local Government Training Program in Taiwan.

Irrigation: Major emphasis should be placed on developing an extensive irrigation system during the post-war period. At present, decisions affecting this program are made at the Central Government level. More of this authority should be shifted to the provinces. This authority should include all aspects of irrigation: constructing new canals and dredging existing canals, dikes and dams.

A good start has been made by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development through various studies regarding salinity water levels, etc., and with this information local government units can develop their own programs.

Land Reform: Ba Xuyen has surpassed the three-year, 79,900 hectare goal. If the cease-fire is successful, the province will be able to distribute an additional 30,000 hectares. PLAS priorities should place more emphasis on strengthening internal management procedures. The organization to distribute additional land already performs well; now more attention should be focused on land register records, maps, and surveying of distributed land.

Labor: Labor Service is primarily a name only. It is a modest program at best at seems to serve itself rather than the interests of labor unions and employees. It has no job placement service.

Youth Affairs: The Youth Affairs program continues to be viable here. The only comment is that its primary area of interest and influence continues to be in the urban areas vis-a-vis the rural areas where their programs would do the most good.

Public Administration: The overall caliber of village and hamlet personnel has improved significantly under the implementation of Decree No 120. Transferring this characteristic into high-level performance ranks as the number one challenge for province officials and province-level training courses. Many highly competent individuals have been assigned responsibilities outside of their normal positions; others have been assigned additional duties.



The problem will be solved by additional training courses at the Province Training Center. Courses will be structured for new officials and refresher courses for incumbents.

Psychological Operations: The Sector POLWAR Company and VIS continue to support province goals. The POLWAR Culture/Drama Team is an effective medium of providing propaganda and entertainment in rural areas. This major criticism is the delay in reacting to events that occur spontaneously, such as a major terrorist incident. If they have sufficient lead time, then they produce a good product.

#### GENERAL OVERVIEW

The effects of the cease-fire are just starting to be realized. Although the HES shows a dramatic increase in pacification during the month of December, I do not feel it is currently a true picture of the territorial security in Ba Xuyen. Communist units still operate within the less secure areas and pose a viable threat to the periphery villages.

Some of Ba Xuyen's major problem areas are that, too many RF companies are occupying OB's. Emphasis is continually required to improve the status of maintenance and supply economy. The concept of preventive maintenance is universally ignored. Training in these subjects needs upgrading along with a course in maintenance such as the US Army has at Fort Knox for commanders.

Political: The new Ba Xuyen Province Chief has yet to be named, and as so much will depend on Colonel Ha's successor that it is difficult to speculate on future political trends. The Cambodian issue continues to be a possible major problem area. If the Cambodian Community is alienated, then many viable programs would undoubtedly suffer. The present Province Chief has circumvented major confrontations by resorting to conferences with ethnic minority leaders during times of stress.

Governmental: Programs should be tailored to the needs of a large urban village. Since about 20% of our local officials have new jobs under Decree 120, it would be advisable to schedule courses for new personnel and refresher training for the remaining officials. FMATs could be used to explain new programs such as taxes. Training is also needed in procedures in relation to the 1974 tax law.

Additional emphasis should be placed on preparation and review of tax rolls so that each individual pays his fair share.

Province budgets should be encouraged to contribute to local VSD programs. MORD funds could be used to encourage this. Priority should be placed on inter-village and scholarship programs. The rural credit program should establish a goal to provide credit for LTT applicants at village level. Goals should be specific, such as number of LTT applicants multiplied by a set amount/hectare = Village Budget contribution to this program. A new program of Health Education should be oriented under the same pattern as the grade school "Health for Study" program. A survey of teacher placement is recommended to insure



that teachers are placed where needed. Advanced registration of students would also greatly assist this program.

Future Organizational Concepts: The organization of a development effort under a USAID/State organization should concentrate on the development of government organizations, and the structure should follow the existing government scheme as much as possible.

Artificial management entities should be avoided for the primary mission of any organization should be the implementation of the program through the operating counterpart unit. Management directives and guidance should be joint directives from USAID/State-Counterpart organizations with joint responses expected from the field. When independent responses are expected, the American/counterpart organizations should be informed of this demand. If one level requests input from a lower level, the response should reflect the situation of that level, not that of another operating level.

In order to improve efficiency of operating organizations and demonstrated management expertise, care should be taken to maintain advisory participation at a minimum. As has already been stated, the organization should correspond to the host country government organization. Administrative and staff support sections should be held to an absolute minimum.

Employees should be encouraged to live on the economy as much as possible; local agency hired employees should be operational and functional, not supportive.

Independent guidance, whether technical or managerial, should be kept to an absolute minimum; counterpart guidance should be encouraged.

Maintenance of separate lines of communication outside of counterpart facilities should be discouraged, except for ordinary mail service.

More emphasis should be placed on recruiting advisors who are technically competent and training them as project managers, general development managers as opposed to people who exhibit general management ability without any technical competence. Individuals should be qualified in the language in which they operate or be effective in using interpreters.

Care should be taken to insure that more advisors can maintain as natural a life as possible. Excluding the advisor's family from the advisory role is unacceptable. If the advisor is married, he should have his wife and family with him. A married man lives differently from a single man; a married counterpart has a different outlook on life from a single counterpart, and correspondingly he expects the advisor to assume a different role. Also, most counterpart families want to establish a social relationship with the advisor's family.

In order to develop strong professional groups of advisors, it is necessary to recognize the role of the family. In most developing countries, the family occupies the primary position; thus the advisor's family also occupies

a primary position in his career and professional success. The advisor's family should not live in isolationist splendor in a far-away city; they should live and work in the areas in which advising occur.

Management incentives should be designed to include the family and not isolate them.

HEADQUARTERS  
ADVISORY TEAM 71 (BA XUYEN PROVINCE)  
DELTA REGIONAL ASSISTANCE COMMAND  
APO 96215

MACDR-71

12 February 1973

LTC Huynh Buu Son  
Deputy Sector Commander  
Ba Xuyen Province

Dear Colonel Son,

It is with deep regret that I depart Ba Xuyen and the fine officers and men of the sector forces. This is indeed the most critical phase of the war, where major political battles will be waged alongside of conventional military engagements. The struggle for political goals will be the most decisive that South Vietnam has yet had to face.

I am very optimistic about the future of Ba Xuyen and the loyalty of the soldiers and residents of this Province. It is my most ardent wish that peace will soon come to every man, woman, and child in Ba Xuyen. To keep the peace will require all the wisdom and skill that you and other leaders can put together.

As the role of local problems shift from the battlefield to the political area, you can expect unforeseen challenge to confront you and your staff. This challenge will extend from local, organized political factions to pressure groups from the most remote hamlet in the province. The Communists will attempt to subvert these groups for their own goals while building their own organizational hierarchy. To counter this effort, the infrastructure of the Communists must be neutralized. The Protection of the People Against Terrorism Program is an excellent tool to accomplish this. From a management standpoint, the results of this program have not justified the expense and manpower resources allocated. It has the organizational framework and resources available to perform this function, but it has not yet done so. The institution of controls and command guidance has been weak and thereby failed to have a significant impact on enemy organizations.

To improve this system, we should improve administrative management, and create a faster and better organized system of collecting information and processing information into useful intelligence. A methodology that has been successful in other parts of the world is the case system where one case worker targets designated the individuals and becomes directly responsible for their neutralization. We also need immediate evaluation and reaction to intelligence, and last but not least, continuous command emphasis.

12 February 1973

The capability of your military forces will offer the single most important deterrent to Communist aggression in the future. If, in the estimate of the Communists, your military can be defeated or by-passed by their forces, they are sure to attempt simply to overpower your country. With the complete withdrawal of allied forces and restrictions on resupply, it is essential that you take all steps possible to insure that your military equipment is in top condition. Progress in the past few months has been good, but more positive steps are needed (1) to employ the manpower resources more effectively, (2) to improve training and discipline and (3) to improve maintenance and supply economy. Regional forces should be 100% mobile! All mobile forces should be employed as companies or battalions. The success of the Biet Kich companies has been the single most effective tool in destroying the enemy capability and keeping the enemy off balance. The mobility of these companies has put fear in the heart of the enemy, has given you a tremendous amount of flexibility, and has kept the soldiers in a high state of training. This success should be expanded to utilize manpower resources more efficiently.

An intensive program of training is seriously needed to improve the quality of the individual soldier and unit tactics. This training should begin where the training center leaves off. One available technique is first to decide on the subjects to be included in a training program. Then, divide these subjects among the OB Commanders and train them in the subjects they are to teach. As the soldiers are rotated from OB to OB, you can effectively conduct a continuous training cycle. This is only one of many techniques. There are others within your capability. The important thing is to accomplish training and to emphasize military discipline. Weapons maintenance is outstanding. Your soldiers maintain their weapons, and there are frequent inspections and visits by maintenance contact teams. Ammunition and vehicle maintenance is generally poor. This is caused by a lack of training, organization and supervision. I have observed serious problems in storage and handling of ammunition. The loss of ammunition, due to poor storage, combined with much needless firing of ammunition probably doubles your ammunition requirements each month. Vehicles which should be deadlined are continued in operation, often causing further damage. Drivers often perform maintenance which they are not authorized, or trained, to perform and overlook normal operator maintenance. This indicates a lack of **training**, and the organization of an effective maintenance program and supervisor. This can be corrected through a few hours of simple operator instruction, organization of a maintenance program, and continuous command emphasis on proper maintenance management at all levels. Your country cannot afford these present wasteful practices.

Village and hamlet administration has made outstanding improvements in the past year. Province attention to these levels of government has eliminated much of the inefficiency and corruption. The people must have confidence in the local government, and the local government must give its fullest loyalty to the people as well as to the higher echelons of government if peace, prosperity and happiness are to prevail. You have made much progress in the

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right direction. I would only recommend that you and your staff conduct more frequent and extensive inspections of village level government. These inspections should be formal to include a complete briefing by the Village Chief on all of his areas of responsibility. Your administrative staff should inspect administrative and financial records with the objective being to improve the management of village government and to keep you personally informed on the current village situation.

In summary, progress in Ba Xuyen has been outstanding. The credit for the operational improvements are yours, because as Deputy Sector Commander, you have been directly responsible for them. I have sincerely enjoyed working with you and your fine staff and the warm friends I have had in Ba Xuyen.

I want especially to thank you and your gracious wife for the personal friendship you have extended to me. My sincerest wish for a happy life for you and your family.

Sincerely,

**SIGNED**

FREDERICK R. DALY  
LTC, FA  
Deputy Province Senior Advisor

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